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ABSTRACT
Geospatial data play a key role in a wide spectrum of critical
data management applications, such as disaster and emer-
gency management, environmental monitoring, land and city
planning, and military operations, often requiring the coor-
dination among diverse organizations, their data reposito-
ries, and users with different responsibilities. Although a
variety of models and techniques are available to manage,
access and share geospatial data, very little attention has
been paid to addressing security concerns, such as access
control, security and privacy policies, and the development
of secure and in particular interoperable GIS applications.
The objective of this paper is to discuss the technical chal-
lenges raised by the unique requirements of secure geospatial
data management and to suggest a comprehensive frame-
work for security and privacy for geospatial data and GIS.
Such a framework is the first coherent architectural approach
to the problem of security and privacy for geospatial data.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
Spatial Databases and GIS ; K.6.5 [Management of Com-
puting and Information Systems]: Security and Pro-
tection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Management, Security, Theory, Legal Aspects
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GIS, Geospatial Data, Security, Privacy
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1. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in sensor technology, satellite imagery, and
field surveys have made it possible to generate and collect
large amounts of geospatial data, at an ever increasing level
of temporal coverage and spatial resolution. For example,
thematic and topographical maps in support of disaster and
emergency management, homeland security, and environ-
mental crises provide geospatial data for various features
of locations and facilities at very fine-grained levels of de-
tail. These advancements have recently raised many data
security, privacy, and safeguarding concerns, not only by
the public but also by federal, state, and local government
organizations, which are concerned that publicly available
geospatial information can be exploited by attackers for cor-
rupting critical infrastructures and compromising the secu-
rity and privacy of people, property, and systems.
National and international efforts, such as the National
Spatial Data Infrastructure [49], the Global Earth Observa-
tion System of Systems [8], and the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Initiative [7], primarily focus on the coordinated
development, use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial
data among the wide range of federal government agencies
and offices. While consistent and reliable means to manage,
share, and access geospatial data are available, very little at-
tention has been given to addressing security concerns, such
as access control, security and privacy policies, and the de-
velopment of secure interoperable GIS applications. This is
despite many reports, such as the RAND vulnerability re-
port [15] and the NSDI Guidelines for Providing Appropriate
Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns
[48], which identify the various potential risks that arise due
to the production and (public) dissemination of geospatial
information. These reports in particular call for mechanisms
to safeguard the increasing amount of geospatial data.
To date, however, the problem of security and privacy for
geospatial data and GIS has not been much investigated and
there is not even a comprehensive understanding of all the
issues that need to be addressed. The goal of this paper is to
identify and explore such issues and develop a comprehensive
framework for security and privacy for geospatial data and
GIS.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
three real world scenarios; such scenarios provide concrete
examples motivating the needs for research in the area of
security and privacy for geospatial data and GIS. The exam-
ples also show that in most cases GIS and geospatial applica-
tions need interoperable access to heterogeneous data repos-
itories, which poses interesting security challenges. Section
3 discusses security issues that are unique to geospatial data
and argues that current security and privacy solutions de-
veloped for conventional data are not adequate. We then
proposes a comprehensive framework that is the first coher-
ent architectural approach to the problem of security and
privacy for geospatial data. Any actual solution will likely
implement most of the components of the suggested frame-
work. Based on such a framework, in Section 6, the paper
explores research issues by discussing in detail requirements,
shortcomings of current approaches, and possible solutions.
Relevant issues include access control models for geospatial
data, privacy, and trust. Many relevant open issues are iden-
tified throughout the discussion. The paper concludes by
outlining suitable evaluation metrics for the envisioned so-
lutions and presenting concluding remarks.
2. CURRENT PRACTICES AND MOTIVA-
TIONAL SCENARIOS
To better illustrate the diverse and complex security and
privacy requirements of geospatial data repositories and ap-
plications, we outline some practically relevant GIS appli-
cation scenarios increasingly complex in nature. The main
theme of the scenarios is to demonstrate the need for a secu-
rity and privacy management framework in support of GIS
applications typically used in disaster and emergency prepa-
ration, mitigation, and response. The basis for our scenar-
ios is a collection of GIS repositories available for Northern
California, directly accessible through the California Spatial
Information Library (CaSIL)1.
As illustrated in Fig.1, for particular geographic regions,
several thematic layers of geospatial data are available. A
collection of layers is typically managed by a single federal,
state, or local organization; there is no single organization
that manages all geospatial data of interest for all regions.
For example, water resource thematic layers, managed by
an organization such as the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
comprise information about streams, drainage areas, sur-
face terrains, and rainfall responses for particular regions.
Census unit and boundary layers manage information about
administrative units (e.g., blocks and tracts), streets and ad-
dresses as well as municipal, county, state, and federal census
boundaries.
A base layer can be either an image, i.e., field-based data
in the form of satellite imagery or a digitized map, or some
vector data that represent particular geographic features of
interest, such as roads, buildings, and particular public and
private areas. Vector data may include fine-grained type
information, such as types of roads, buildings etc. In general,
all data managed in a GIS repository is geo-referenced, thus
providing an easy way to stack layers in order to obtain new
(derived) GIS layers and data products. The hybrid-view
feature in Web map servers such as Google Maps, Google
Earth, NASA World Wind, and Yahoo! Maps is a prominent
example of the overlay of satellite imagery with vector data,
such as streets, boarders, and services.
1http://casil.ucdavis.edu or http://gis.ca.gov
Scenario I.
Assume a single GIS data repository that manages infor-
mation about parcels (as basic units of geography for local
government) and cadastre, including land use and zoning,
environmental areas, and municipal utility services. Such
type of repository is typically used by public sector staff at
the municipal level to assist property owners and to sup-
port emergency, fire, and police operations. The latter type
of usage includes identifying property structures and own-
ers. Parcel maps in particular can be useful to do damage
assessment after a disaster. They are also an important ac-
cess point during emergencies for linking data from different
GIS repositories. While such types of geospatial are used
to serve the public, e.g., through Web-based interfaces, not
all data layers are made publicly available. For example,
fine-grained property owner demographic information is not
publicly accessible. A similar separation of public and pri-
vate GIS data can be made for other types of themes. For
example, environmental theme layers do not make informa-
tion about locations of endangered species or nesting sites
public.
Analysis: Based on this type of separation of GIS data,
the following question arises: What security mechanisms are
used to specify and enforce different types of access to data
in a single GIS repository? In particular, what provisions
do GIS data managers have to (1) give public sector staff
only access to GIS data relevant to their function, and (2)
ensure that no sensitive geospatial data (e.g., parcel owner
information) is made public?
In current GIS practice, access control is typically real-
ized at the theme layer level, not taking into account com-
plex geospatial features, the composition of features through
theme overlays and in particular the overlay of satellite im-
agery with vector data. How can one blend out or obfuscate
particular geospatial features at one theme layer so that sen-
sitive features at another layer cannot be derived by a simple
overlay? Regarding satellite imagery, they are provided by
Google Maps at a resolution of a few inches for some U.S.
states. That is, fine-grained satellite imagery and aerial pho-
tography is already publicly available. Therefore, while ac-
cess control may not be an issue here, the more interesting
security aspect is the study of potential privacy threats that
may occur when high-resolution satellite imagery is com-
bined with vector data layers, in particular when the vec-
tor data represent demographic (and possibly aggregated)
data of people living in an area. Such aspects are key to
geo-marketing. In general, privacy in GIS is not well under-
stood (e.g., [31, 32, 50]), and thus requires a more thorough
investigation in the context of disaster and emergency man-
agement.
Scenario II.
Suppose California is preparing for a potential natural dis-
aster, say a major flooding in the Sacramento/San Joaquin
area. Geospatial data is clearly key to disaster preparation
and response, which is conducted by various county and
municipal emergency service teams. Information from au-
tonomous GIS repositories, each managing geospatial data
for a particular thematic aspect such as hydrology, parcels,
land use, health facilities etc., needs to be integrated to sim-
ulate events over time and to plan the coordination of emer-
gency mitigation tasks. Simulations address aspects such as
assessment of potential damages to critical utility and trans-
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Figure 1: Example of several GIS repositories and GIS themes/layers for Northern California
portation infrastructures or planning for the evacuation of
the public in endangered areas, to name a few.
Analysis: If the entire body of geospatial data would
be made available by simply integrating the data from the
different repositories, there is clearly a potential for data
misuse and privacy violations. Sensitive information such
as building ownerships might be revealed or information
about critical infrastructure could become publicly accessi-
ble. Given the number of people and organizations involved
in a disaster preparation scenario, security measures must be
taken to provide users and applications only with data on a
need-to-know basis. Building on the security and privacy re-
quirements indicated in Scenario I, the question is how such
security mechanisms, if present in individual should GIS,
be extended to be applicable to interoperable GIS reposito-
ries and applications? Assuming individual GIS repositories
have been equipped with access controls and security mech-
anisms, security policies now spanning several repositories
need to be integrated and analyzed to discover potential se-
curity and privacy violations. Role-based access controls for
interoperable GIS repositories seem a desirable mechanism
to address these important security requirements. However,
none of these provisions are made in such types of GIS ap-
plications, despite being strongly emphasized in the recent
NSDI report [48]. A key question is How to set up a secure
interoperable GIS framework?
Scenario III.
The above scenario presumably takes place in a static set-
ting. That is, geographic data sets and associated security
policies are integrated in a controlled and stepwise manner
to satisfy the diverse information requirements of applica-
tions employed in the simulation. This changes once a dis-
aster or emergency actually occurs. No simulation can an-
ticipate all possible scenarios, required geographic data sets,
and supporting GIS applications. Thus, in the event of an
emergency, it is very likely that new data sets need to be
integrated in an ad-hoc fashion, data requirements of appli-
cations change over time, GIS data sets need to be updated
to account for changes in the real-world, and in particular
access and privacy policies need to be adjusted.
Analysis: While geospatial data integration approaches
likely suffice to integrate heterogeneous forms of geo-refer-
enced data, it is not clear how security and privacy man-
agement should occur. Many security principles are often
abandoned in favor of timely access to mission critical data.
An important aspect often neglected in this approach is that
a disaster causes changes to the transportation and utility
infrastructure, building, geological properties of areas, and
location of potentially large parts of the population in af-
fected areas. A key question then is How the geographic
data used by GIS applications can be kept up-to-date, reli-
able, and trustworthy while still enforcing basic security and
privacy needs? Ideally, security policies and mechanisms
should be more dynamic, context-dependent, and reactive.
All this should happen with little intervention from GIS data
managers and disaster response teams. For example, con-
sider a team of first responders that reports a road being
damaged. This information needs to be fed back into the
interoperable GIS infrastructure in a trustworthy manner.
Also, teams might require immediate access to previously
(because of security and privacy policies) restricted infor-
mation, for example, in case another team is requesting help
in evacuating elderly people from some buildings. How can
one still support appropriate levels of data privacy? How can
one minimize the risk of misuse in such dynamic settings?
Virtually no work has been carried out to address such press-
ing security and privacy needs. Respective security models,
techniques, and architectures are not yet established for even
individual GIS data repositories.
3. SECURITY ISSUES UNIQUE TO GEO-
SPATIAL DATA
Security issues for geospatial data are different and in
many ways more complex than security issues for relational
data. These differences concern both the data organization
and structures, and in particular the ways the data are used.
In a GIS, data is typically organized in different thematic
layers; these layers, which can be large in number, represent
different aspects of an application domain. Also, the same
spatial region can be represented by either field-based data,
i.e., satellite imagery or map data, or by vector-based data,
i.e., a collection of possibly complex geographic features. Be-
cause of the organization in layers, the same geo-references
feature, e.g., a building or road, can be represented in dif-
ferent layers and ways.
Geospatial data can be characterized as complex data ob-
jects with complex relationships among them. Securing this
type of data poses challenges that are yet to be fully un-
derstood and addressed. For example, integrity techniques
(such as Merkle hash tree) have been developed for simpler
data structures, but not for complex objects with complex
relationships. Access control and privacy pose many issues,
such as the unit of protection. Is such unit a layer, a por-
tion of a layer, a geographic feature presented at a layer,
a component of a feature, an application entity (indepen-
dent from the layers in which it appears)? Are relationships
also to be protected by access control? How does one spec-
ify and enforce content-based access control? The conven-
tional view mechanisms developed for relational databases
would not work here since diverse context information may
not be readily accessible in a view. In terms of data us-
age, many applications generating and using geospatial data
are dynamic as the set of subjects and geographic features
may dynamically and rapidly change, as in the case of dy-
namic GIS coalitions for emergency response. Moreover, in
such context, one may need to combine data from several
sources that are independently administered and therefore
characterized by heterogeneous security policies. Such us-
age requires different approaches to architecting the data
security solutions. For example, one may need to perform
dynamic security policy reconfiguration and merge possibly
large numbers of heterogeneous security policies due to the
complexity and diversity of geospatial features and opera-
tions on such features.
Several questions need answers in order to appropriately
secure geospatial data. Since geospatial data come in diverse
formats, such as thematic maps or satellite imagery, what is
an appropriate data model underlying a security framework
to specify semantic-rich security policies and to reason about
such policies? What constitutes the notion of a geospatial
feature, collections and compositions of features, and oper-
ations on these features? What types of security policies for
geospatial data are necessary and how can such policies be
composed in a meaningful and consistent manner? How do
we integrate active aspects into policies, such as blending out
or obfuscating particular features? How do reasoning tech-
niques for security policies take advantage of topological and
spatio-temporal properties of geospatial data? What con-
stitutes a modular approach for a service-oriented security
architecture to manage geospatial data, and how does such
an infrastructure interact with diverse types of GIS data
repositories and applications? How will such an infrastruc-
ture change the way practitioners and researchers manage
the security and privacy of geospatial data? A better under-
standing of these issues will provide insights to design and
implement modular, scalable, and service-oriented systems
for the secure management of geospatial data.
4. RELATED WORK
There has been considerable work in building security in-
frastructures for relational data and, more recently, semi-
structured data. Several access control models and security
policy frameworks have been developed (see, e.g., [23, 24, 37,
36, 57]). Many of these techniques have been successfully de-
ployed as part of database management systems. Relevant
models also take into account organizational functions such
as role-based access control (e.g., [19, 55, 56]) and credential-
based access control [22, 61]. Techniques for composing and
reasoning about security policies (e.g., [20, 39, 42, 53, 58]) as
well as concepts for managing trust and privacy have been
developed. All these developments have led to principles
and paradigms for the secure management of data in the
traditional realm of relational and semi-structured data.
One approach would be to adopt and extend such security
models and techniques to geospatial data and GIS applica-
tions. However, the complexity and heterogeneity of geospa-
tial data as well as the various non-traditional (compared to
relational) operations on geospatial data pose several chal-
lenges, requiring research on the theory and the engineering
of geospatial security models, techniques, and tools. Some
work on securing geospatial data systems has been reported.
However, existing access control models and techniques for
geospatial data primarily consider only one type of data, ei-
ther field-based data (e.g., [13, 14]) or feature-based data
(e.g., [16, 21]). There is no framework that investigates
the (dynamic) combination of field- and feature-based data,
the required functionality of a uniform and comprehensive
security and privacy policy specification language, implica-
tions on reasoning about policies, and realizing policies in
practical geographical application settings, including secu-
rity mechanisms for GIS, service-oriented architectures, and
Web services. On the other hand, the emerging application
and research areas of spatially-aware or location-based access
control models [28, 41] do not address the issue of geospa-
tial data protection, but rather focus on the use of position
information for strong access control, which is a different
objective.
5. A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR GEOSPATIAL DATA SECURITY
The development of a comprehensive and coherent frame-
work for managing the security of interoperable GIS data
repositories and applications (see Fig. 2) requires investi-
gating several issues and novel specialized tools, including
the following.
Security Policy Specification and Reasoning. Most
geospatial applications require fine-grained and flexible ac-
cess to geospatial data. Building ad-hoc data sets for each
type of access and application is not suitable when the user
community is large and dynamic, and access control policies
change in the case of certain events, such as those dealt with
in emergency situations. Relevant components of a security
policy specification and reasoning framework include:
• A comprehensive geospatial data model that is able to
express different types of geospatial and spatio-temporal
data (geographic features and field-based data), and
that provides a rich set of typical operations on geospa-
tial data (image operations and spatial transforms).
• A security policy specification tool supporting multi-
ple geospatial data representations and granularities,
feature and policy grouping mechanisms, diverse data
access and modification rights, active policies, and dy-
namic application contexts and user populations.
• A security policy reasoning tool able to determine in-
consistent and redundant policies at policy compile
time and/or data access time. One approach toward
the development of such tool is to extend existing logic-
based reasoning approaches to incorporate specifics of
geospatial data, such as topological and temporal prop-
erties.
• Access control modules organized as service to GIS
repositories, applications, and Web services, to verify
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Figure 2: Components of the proposed security and privacy framework
accesses to and operations on (possibly distributed and
heterogeneous) GIS repositories.
Interoperability of Security Policies. Many emerging
GIS applications and services rely on standards developed
by the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) [3]. In order
to provide a feasible security and privacy approach that can
be applied in practical settings and real-world applications,
one should:
• Incorporate components of the adopted geospatial data
model and security policy specification language into
standards such as the Geography Markup Language
(GML) [9] based application schemas, Web Feature/
Coverage Services, and Web Map Services.
• Develop mapping techniques specialized for the inte-
gration and translation of security policies and among
heterogeneous and distributed GIS repositories.
Trust, Privacy and Integrity. Data privacy and trust
play a crucial role in GIS applications that deal with private
and mission critical data. It is important to have mecha-
nisms that detect tampering with the data or the release of
private data, thus undermining their integrity and privacy.
To address such concerns, services need to be developed that
provide a modular extension of the policy specification and
reasoning framework. More specifically, activities should:
• Design and implement a trust management component
to enforce trust-based policies that describe what level
of trust should be placed on users and geospatial data
sets in dynamic and context-based scenarios, in par-
ticular those in the context of dynamic GIS repository
coalitions.
• Develop a privacy-centric security policy and enforce-
ment component that will handle both trusted and un-
trusted GIS applications that require exact geospatial
data for a service.
• Develop mechanisms and techniques that allow users
to verify the trustworthiness of geospatial data through
authentic data publication schemes, ideally in combi-
nation with GIS Web Services.
6. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We now discuss research directions concerning individual
components of the security framework proposed in the pre-
vious section, and we illustrate how to integrate them into a
scalable, coherent and flexible architecture. For each of the
components, we outline some of the requirements, current
state-of-the-art approaches and their limitations, and some
possible approaches.
6.1 Geospatial Data Model:
Conceptual Framework and Realization
Requirements. A fundamental requirement for the spec-
ification of security and privacy policies for different repre-
sentations of geospatial data and for reasoning about such
policies is a geospatial data model (GDM). Such a model
defines different types of spatially referenced objects and a
precise semantics for operations on these objects. In partic-
ular, it provides the basic vocabulary for specifying security
policies.
Current approaches and limitations. Existing GDMs
either deal only with feature-based (also known as object-
based) data, such as vector data, maps, or thematic lay-
ers [52], or field-based data, such as satellite imagery and
aerial photography [40, 45]. There is no model that com-
bines feature-based and field-based data in a single coher-
ent and semantic rich framework as basis for the security
requirements outlined in Section 5. What does it mean to
discuss geospatial features in a layer that is a combination of
a satellite imagery overlaid with some vector data? A com-
prehensive GDM is crucial to specify meaningful security
policies for geospatial data and to reason about such poli-
cies. For example, if field-based data can easily be overlaid
with vector data in an application but there is no provision
in terms of security policy and access control for restrict-
ing such operations, sensitive information might be revealed
to users, thus potentially violating privacy policies. These
types of operations are typically supported by most GIS and
Web Services, and several security threat scenarios are con-
ceivable that cannot be dealt with using existing technology
and security mechanisms.
Approach: The Core Geospatial Data Model. In or-
der to address the pressing needs for a comprehensive GDM
as basis for our proposed geospatial security framework, a
suitable approach is to extend the Layered Spatial Data
Model (LSDM) [17], which is a reference framework for mul-
tiple representations of geographic maps and supports point,
line, and region data. To be viable for security and privacy,
such an extension, that we refer to as Generalized LSDM,
has to integrate field-based data into LSDM and provide a
rich set of operations on feature- and field-based data as
well as combinations thereof. Fig. 3 illustrates the layering.
In addition, such a model should support temporal features
(time-stamped data, events, and moving objects), feature
composition, grouping of features - the latter two aspects
being an important functionality for specifying security poli-
cies at different levels of object granularity. Operations on
features in GLSDM should include: feature selections (based
on non-spatial feature properties), spatial and temporal se-
lections, spatial transforms for both feature- and field-based
data (map and spatial re-projections, zooming, general affine
transformations [34, 45], and map algebra operations [59],
neighborhood operations, traditional GIS theme operations
(theme selection, overlay, union, merger), and insertions,
deletions, and modifications of features.
Figure 3: GIS data layers (themes)
Conceptually, GLSDM can be designed as a logic-based
language, primarily to allow for effective policy reasoning
techniques and tools. That is, a logic-based language can
be used to describe geospatial features and operations on
the features in the context of the security layer (see Fig. 2).
In such context, the OGC framework and the Geographic
Markup Language (GML) [6, 43] can be used to draw fea-
ture types and operations on (collections of) features from
GML core and application schemas. These schemas serve
as main vocabularies to specify security and privacy poli-
cies. GML offers several components for modeling geometry,
topology, temporal elements, dynamic features, and coordi-
nate reference systems. These core components thus need
to be mapped into GLSDM; approaches to perform a one-
to-one mapping between a GML application schema and an
instance of GLSDM thus need to be investigated. Further-
more, in order to integrate field-based data into such a map-
ping, one possibility is to investigate the recently proposed
JPEG 2000 standard2, which can be used as reference format
for satellite imagery and aerial photography. In fact, OGC
recently initiated the support of GML metadata encoding in
JPEG 2000 Image files, thus providing the proposed frame-
work and model with a coherent framework to draw upon
both feature- and field-based data and object types. Thus,
by mapping GML features and metadata specifications into
GLSDM, one can describe security policies that are tightly
integrated with GML application schemas and services using
these schemas, such as Web Feature Services, Web Coverage
Services, and Web Map Services.
6.2 Policy Specification and Reasoning
Framework
Requirements. The development of a policy specification
and reasoning framework for geospatial data and applica-
tions poses a number of challenging requirements, arising
from the richness and multiplicity of data representations,
the dynamic and mobile user populations, and dynamic ap-
plication contexts as illustrated in the scenarios. Relevant
requirements include:
(i) the specification of authorizations against geospatial
objects at flexible granularity levels, and for the vari-
ous spatial representations, object dimensions, and res-
olution;
(ii) a variety of object grouping mechanisms, based not
only on feature types, but also on object content and
metadata, and spatial position;
(iii) a variety of access rights corresponding to operations
that can be executed on data;
(iv) mechanisms for dynamically generating modified rep-
resentations of protection objects, through, for exam-
ple, obfuscation and blurring, depending of the privi-
leges of the subject accessing the objects and the con-
tents of the objects; we refer to such mechanisms as
active authorizations;
(v) attribute-based and profile-based user specification and
authorization;
(vi) event-based activation/deactivation of policies.
Current approaches and limitations. Despite the rele-
vance of access control in the context of high-assurance se-
curity for geospatial data, no comprehensive approach exists
addressing these requirements. Current approaches can be
categorized in two broad classes, based on whether they are
more focused on geospatial representation of data, as in spa-
tial data infrastructures [14, 16, 21, 46], or user mobility, as
in location-based services [25, 27, 38, 41]. These approaches
suffer from several shortcomings, such as lack of integration
with current standards for geospatial data, limited set of ac-
cess rights, limited support in access control rules for the rich
and complex structures, no support for dynamic policies,
active authorization and modularization, and no reasoning
mechanisms. Notably the GeoXACML model [46] has re-
cently acquired the status of an OGC standard [1]. Yet the
2http://www.jpeg.org/jpeg2000/
model only provides some basic functionality for integrating
spatial data and functions into XACML.
Approach: The policy model and language. The core
of any suitable approach to security for geospatial data is
represented by a semantically rich logical model for access
control; this model is the basis on which access control deci-
sions are made and reasoning is performed. The core model,
however, is not intended to be used by users or applications
and a concrete syntax of the model would also need to be de-
veloped based on GML and other relevant standards, such as
XACML. The policy model must support a broad spectrum
of dimensions in access control policies, including:
• Deny/allow policies with flexible granularity, grouping
mechanisms for protected objects, and space-related ac-
cess restrictions. Deny/allow policies can be supported
through the use of positive/negative authorizations;
negative authorizations are crucial in order to support
exceptions by which, for example, an authorization is
assigned to all objects in a set but one. In our con-
text, this paradigm is complicated by the larger op-
tions that we provide for denoting protected objects
and by the presence of different object representations
and dimensions. A possible main mechanism that we
propose to support flexible grouping is based on the no-
tions of object-locator and spatial window. An object-
locator is a query expression that may include predi-
cates against properties of feature types, metadata and
provenance data. Predicates may also refer to topolog-
ical relationships holding among the data objects, such
as Within and Touches. An example of a policy using
Touches is the one allowing a subject, which has access
to information on a particular land parcel, to access in-
formation about all adjacent land parcels. The query
expression may also include a projection component
to specify an object representation and components.
A spatial window is simply a spatial region in the ref-
erence space and denotes the set of objects that are
inside the boundary of the region. By combining two
such mechanisms, one can specify sets of objects such
as all shelters occupying an area greater than 3000sf in
Yolo County ; in this case Yolo County represents the
authorization window. The use of spatial windows is
particularly important to give/deny authorizations to
insert or modify features in a given spatial region.
• Active policies. These are policies that, when applied
to a protected object, perform certain transformations
on the object before returning it to the requester. Two
relevant classes are filtering policies and obfuscating
policies. Filtering policies refer to policies that filter
out some portions of the objects before returning them
to the users. These policies are directly supported by
the suggested object locator mechanisms. Obfuscat-
ing policies act like filter policies except that they do
not simply select objects but perform possibly com-
plex computations on the feature(s) to be returned.
Typical examples include computing a lower resolution
image, and distorting some vector data (but preserv-
ing topological relationships). In our proposed model
these policies are supported by the projection compo-
nent, suitably extended with the possibility of invoking
functions of the object locator. We expect that such
functions can be provided as part of a pre-defined li-
brary.
• Context-dependent access control policies. Under such
policies, information from the environment is taken
into account by the access control module when taking
decisions about access requests. Typical contextual in-
formation includes time and subject location. Subject
location information is used to specify policies allowing
a subject to access a resource only if the current loca-
tion of the subject verifies certain spatial constraints.
Context-dependent access policies can be supported by
the introduction of a context component, as part of au-
thorization rules, and by attribute-based specification
of subjects in authorization rules.
• Event-based access control policies. Event-based access
control policies are novel and are based on the idea that
policies can be enabled/disabled depending on the oc-
currence of specified events. Events can include data
modifications, very much like in database triggers, or
application-dependent events, such as an emergency.
We notice that current sensor networks and intelligent
appliances make it very easy for a computer system
to detect events arising in the environments. It is im-
portant that such capabilities be exploited as part of
a model like the one envisioned here.
Authorization Model. The basic element of the envi-
sioned logical access control model is represented by the no-
tion of authorization, which is a 7-tuple of the form
{Ev,Co, Sj,Op,Ol, Sw,Ef}
whose components represent the Event (Ev), the Context
(Co), the Subject (Sj), the Operation (Op), the Object
Locator (Ol), the Spatial Window (Sw), and the Effect
(Ef).
The Effect component specifies the intended effect of the
authorization, that is, Permit to give access, Deny to deny
access, Partial Permit to give access under the condition
that the object is modified according to the functions spec-
ified in the Object Locator component of the authorization.
Authorizations having as effect Partial Permit are active au-
thorizations in that they dynamically modify the objects re-
turned to the application. Different active authorizations
can be specified for the same protected objects and differ-
ent subjects, thus allowing different subjects to see different
representations of the protected objects, according to their
need to know. The Object Locator component of an au-
thorization thus consists of the specification of a protected
object, or set of protected objects, according to the GLSDM
language (or to the language used for spatial data represen-
tation), and of an optional transformation function.
In addition to what we have already discussed, it is impor-
tant to point out that the Subject can be not only a user
id or a (possibly spatial) role, but also a Boolean combina-
tion of predicates against subject attributes; in such case,
the authorization applies to all users verifying such Boolean
combination. The Operation component of the authoriza-
tion specifies the type of operation that can be executed on
the protected object; such specification may also include a
dimension specification to denote that the operation has to
be restricted only to the specified dimension. For example, a
user can view objects of feature type residential buildings in
maps where they appear but only with dimension 0 (these
objects will be indicated as points in the maps that such
users will view). It is important to note that not all opera-
tions can be applied to all objects. Therefore, the envisioned
authorization model needs to be complemented by a set of
conditions ensuring that each authorization be consistent;
we refer to this form of consistency as well-formedness.
The authorization model needs also to include some deriva-
tion rules supporting the automatic inference of additional
authorizations, referred to as derived authorizations, from
other authorizations. Derivation rules can be further catego-
rized as: structural derivation rules, defined over object rela-
tionships, and application-defined derivation rules. The set
of authorizations and derivation rules comprises the geospa-
tial authorization base, whereas the set of authorizations and
all authorizations that can be derived from this set accord-
ing to the derivation rules comprises the entailed geospatial
authorization base. The mechanism supporting the various
consistency checks, such as well-formedness and authoriza-
tion derivation, is referred to as policy reasoner. An impor-
tant question is related to the consistency of the geospatial
authorization base and the entailed authorization base; be-
cause of negative authorizations and the fact that different
administrative authorities may exist, such bases may con-
tain conflicting authorizations. It is, however, important to
notice that the notion of consistency, due to the various rep-
resentations of objects and conflict resolution techniques for
geospatial authorizations, may be far more complex than in
the case of conventional authorizations. For example, solv-
ing a conflict between two authorizations may require mod-
ifying, through filtering/obfuscating techniques, the repre-
sentation of the objects being accessed.
Reasoning. A spatial policy reasoner typically exploits
techniques proposed for spatial reasoning, such as reasoning
on direction relations [51] and on topological relations [18].
Such techniques exploit properties typical of spatial objects,
for example, if a certain direction relation holds among two
regions, then it holds for all the points inside of these regions.
This type of knowledge could be expressed as structural
derivation rules defined as part of the GLSDM language. In
order to provide support for additional application-dependent
knowledge, it is however crucial to identity a general knowl-
edge representation tool and develop a mapping from the
knowledge encoded in terms of the GLSDM structural deriva-
tion rules onto the language of the identified knowledge rep-
resentation tool. Suitable candidates for such tools are those
based on descriptions in that these logics directly support
the representation of complex objects and would directly
support features that have complex structures.
The reasoner is crucial not only for checking the consis-
tency of authorizations, but also to prevent possible infer-
ences, which is important in order to achieve strong pro-
tection. In particular when dealing with diverse data sets,
describing different aspects of the same set of entities, con-
trolling access to one data set only is not enough, in that
by accessing information from the other datasets, a subject
may still be able to infer the content of the protected dataset.
As an example suppose that there are small airfields inside
a forest; suppose that a subject is given access to a map of
the area in order to see which are the available roads but
he is not supposed the know the location of these airfields;
then one can provide him with a view of this map where the
airfields are not shown. Suppose now that a thematic map
reporting the types of trees in the area is available. This is
useful in the context of fire emergencies. If this map shows
that the area covered by the forest has large holes in which
there are no trees, the subject may infer the presence of
the airfields and may easily locate them. This means that
the thematic map should not show those holes. Similar ex-
amples can be found concerning underground objects. In
order to detect such possible inferences, an approach is to
introduce the notion of strongly protected objects; protect-
ing these objects would require making sure that all their
features be hidden from all possible layers in which the ob-
jects may appear. It would also require determining whether
their presence can be inferred from the presence or absence
of other spatial objects; in our example, the presence of an
area without trees inside a forest may denote the presence of
an airfield in this area. Being able to support such types of
inference requires encoding domain-dependent knowledge,
in addition to basic knowledge about direction and topo-
logical relations. This domain-dependent knowledge can be
typically encoded as a set of application-defined derivation
rules, which is part of the proposed framework.
The authorization model suggested in this paper also needs
to include a suitable administration model, supported by a
high level tool, stating which subjects can grant, revoke, and
modify authorizations. Because geospatial applications may
consist of diverse data and support a variety of applications,
a suitable administration model should support multiple ad-
ministration authorities. In some cases, for a user to access
a complex geospatial object, several authorizations by pos-
sibly different authorities may be required. Mechanisms are
needed to streamline the authorization acquisition process
by the users, without undermining the autonomy of the var-
ious administration authorities involved.
Architectural Organization. The proposed logical model
can be represented as a GML application schema. An impor-
tant question is whether the GML access control application
schema must be integrated with the application schema of
the actual application or can the two schemas be kept sepa-
rated. In general, the latter approach has advantages, such
as modularity. However, because the proposed access control
system will support fine access control granularities, autho-
rizations may directly reference specific objects. An impor-
tant open issue is How to support object references across
different GML application schemas?. A respective architec-
ture should include a tool for authorization administration,
the reasoner, and functions related to authorization enforce-
ment.
A possible approach to integrate the access control system
with other components of the data management infrastruc-
ture is based on an extension of the conceptual approach
defined in the context of the XACML standard. Such an ap-
proach decomposes the functions related to the management
of access control into four components: Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) that receives the access request and returns
authorization decisions to the external environment; Policy
Decision Point (PDP) that evaluates the applicable policies
and renders an authorization decision to the PEP; the Policy
Information Point that serves as source of data required for
policy evaluation, for example location of users; the Policy
Administration Point that supports the policy definitions
and stores them in the appropriate repository. All the data
required by these components, such as authorizations, can
be represented according to the GML access control applica-
tion schema. A major difference with respect to the case of
conventional applications for which XACML was designed
is that in geospatial applications objects and subjects may
be mobile and data and applications have strong integrity
and privacy requirements; access control may thus have to
be performed not only before the access takes place but also
while the access is being executed and possibly after it has
been completed. This calls for a continuous interaction of
the PEP with rest of the data management infrastructure
and requires the PDP to keep track how the status of the
execution of the various access requests. Any suitable so-
lution thus requires revisiting and extending the conceptual
architecture of XACML.
6.3 Policy Interoperability
Requirements. As illustrated in the scenarios, geospatial
data from heterogeneous sources often have to be integrated
in a secure fashion. Industry and federal geospatial clear-
inghouses are collaboratively standardizing the geospatial
data integration process (see [2, 5, 33]). This process does
not address security. While there are many aspects to inte-
grating heterogeneous GIS repositories, in the following, we
will focus on policy integration [11, 12]. Since the individual
agencies implement their own security policies to protect the
data, some issues arise during policy integration.
The first issue is the mismatch of policy rule semantics.
When policies are integrated, attributes and targets of the
policies should be interpreted consistently. For example, if
two policies from separate agencies use manager and super-
visor respectively, to specify the same role attribute, the
integration algorithm should interpret this equivalence.
The second issue is rules mismatch where attribute set and
targets of separate policies have to be matched properly.
Note that in our envisioned 7-tuple logical access model,
the attributes are represented by the subset {Ev,Co, Sj}
(i.e., Effect, Contex, Subject} and targets are specified by
{Ol, Sw} (i.e., {ObjectLocator, SpatialWindow}.
Current approaches and limitations. Current policy
integration algorithms (e.g., [47, 44]) attempt to solve the
rules mismatch problem. However, there are several short-
comings in these approaches with respect to geospatial data
integration. First, they require prior coordination among
the agencies. Geospatial integrated environments are usu-
ally based on autonomous agencies, which manage their se-
curity policies independently of each other. As a result, prior
coordination to integrate security policies may not be fea-
sible. Second, existing models assume that target resources
(i.e., {Ol, Sw}) are the same for the policies to be integrated.
However, one or more subjects in the {Sj} element can re-
quest a hybrid-view of some data where the target from one
agency is field-based and the other is vector-based.
An approach: Geo-referencing. A suitable integration
and interoperation approach is based on the notion of geo-
referencing, in that it is often the case that geospatial datasets
to be integrated contain data items that are geo-referenced
with respect to a coordinate system. This way one can tie
differing targets from separate policies using {Ol, Sw}. In
the hybrid-view raster/vector example, if a subject does not
have access to part of the vector dataset, the coordinates
representing the restricted part allows the integration algo-
rithm to prevent access to corresponding map areas. A pos-
sible approach is based on an algorithm consisting of two
stages: disambiguating naming heterogeneity and resolving
policy mismatch.
Naming heterogeneity can be addressed by utilizing a com-
mon vocabulary that will include rules such as administra-
tor and manager are different roles. This vocabulary may
be generated from the GML schemas and the GIS reposi-
tories (see Fig. 2). Policy mismatch heterogeneity problem
can be addressed by measuring rule similarity and policy
unification. We illustrate the envisioned approach using the
following example.
Consider two geospatial repositories A and B and user
John who is associated with B. A carries raster data whereas
B contains thematic data about census units for a particular
city. Suppose A and B enforce respective policies P1 and
P2:
P1: IF {Subject} ! = Admin & Event(Resolution < 6) &
Event(Alert level < 5) &
Context(Location(33.41 −82.91, 33.43 −82.904))
THEN Effect=Deny on
SpatialWindow(RegionA(33.40 −82.91, 33.43 −82.9101,
33.4301 −82.9103, 33.43 −82.9103 ))
P2: IF {Subject} = Manager & Event(Resolution < 5) &
Event(Alert level < 4) &
Context(Location(33.39 -82.91, 33.43 -82.904))
THEN Effect = Allow on
ObjectLocator(All Features in Zip(79900))
P1 specifies that only an Administrator with a certain
resolution at or above specific alert level can access the map
region represented by an array of latitude/longitude coor-
dinate pairs. P2 specifies that if a manager is at a specific
location, she can access all census data including highways,
streets and addresses for zip code 79900. Now, if we match
these two policies, we will observe two types of heterogene-
ity. The first one is naming heterogeneity. In P1, the Sub-
ject value (i.e., Admin) is different from P2’s Subject (i.e.,
Manager). Once we address this naming heterogeneity, rule
mismatch heterogeneity may occur. Here, the second at-
tribute of the rule in P1 (i.e., Event) is different from P2s
attributes.
Disambiguating naming heterogeneity. Naming het-
erogeneity in policies can be resolved by exploiting a concept-
based model using domain-dependent common vocabularies
(from GML schemas and repositories) that may be part of
GIS repositories. In our envisioned approach, for {Subject},
we define a set of abstract roles with various high and low
level concepts that will help to resolve naming heterogene-
ity. Therefore, if there is an ambiguity in {Subject}, it
can be resolved through the correct interpretation provided
by the vocabulary based on semantic distance. Examples
of {Subject} concepts on the first level are Admin, Man-
ager, Facility Personnel etc. We assume agency B creates
a role called Emergency Operation Commander (EOC) by
taking the union of Manager and Facility Personnel and
assigns it to John. While processing P1 and P2, a vo-
cabulary manager would detect that EOC is made up of
roles that are siblings of Admin. Therefore, the condition
{Subject}! = Admin in P1 is satisfied for John. In other
cases, a new role such as EOC could be made up of concepts
below the Admin level, and we then consider the separation
between the roles to resolve naming heterogeneity.
Resolving policy rule mismatches. To address policy
rule mismatch, one possible approach is to first measure the
similarity of rules across policies and next to apply policy
unification by aligning similar policies.
Policy Similarity Evaluation: Once the semantic hetero-
geneity of attribute terms (e.g., subjects) across policies is
resolved, policies have to be aligned. We consider each 7-
tuple entry as a rule and we calculate the similarity of the
rules across policies. As a result, some rule may be ex-
tended, restricted, etc. by other rules. Consider the above
policies, P1 and P2 consisting of rules r1 and r2, respec-
tively. P1 belongs to the resource holder and P2 belongs to
the agency the requester belongs to. We illustrate the inte-
gration of P1 and P2 with geospatial data. The integration
cases reflect the unique characteristics for geospatial data
discussed in section 1. For example, rules have attributes
that correspond to geospatial objects such as features or
layers. There can be one attribute whose value represents a
bridge feature, while another attribute value represents the
center-line of the bridge. Although the attributes are sepa-
rately specified, from their geo-references we can determine
their geospatial relationship. This helps us to determine
which integration case the attributes falls under. We have
identified five integration cases including:
Case C1 : If attribute values of r1 are matched by r2 and
r1 > r2 (r1 has more attributes than r2) then r1 is
said to extend r2. If the attributes of r1 and r2 are
different, then r1 and r2 are said to diverge.
Case C2 : If only some of the attributes of r1 and r2
match, but not all, then r1 and r2 are said to intersect.
In P1 and P2, the attributes are as follows: a {Subject},
two events and a {Context}. The resolution event refers to
a geospatial constraint on a particular map or image. The
{Context} as defined in Section 6.2 introduces an extent
constraint by specifying the location coordinates that a user
request has to satisfy. Even if P1 and P2 have same set
of policies, the attribute values are different. Suppose P1
allows a higher resolution than P2 and P1’s {Context} con-
tains P2 ’s {Context} location. To illustrate the use of the
integration cases we note that the values for two event at-
tributes in P1 subsume those in P2. Also, since the geospa-
tial extent of {Context} in P1 confines that in P2, we say
P1 extends P2, which falls under case C1. If {Context}
of P1 were contained in P2s {Context}, they would have
intersected (i.e., case C2 ). Therefore, geospatial data deter-
mines the specific case a rule mismatch resolution algorithm
has to follow.
Policy Unification: We factor in the policy combination
algorithms. We consider action/consequent of similar rules
and exploit deny-override and permit-override strategies. The
deny or permit is referred to as policy {Effect} that implies
the final decision on the rule. Since there could be multiple
policies protecting a particular target (i.e., map resource),
one could run into a conflicting scenario where some effects
correspond to deny and others to permit. At this stage,
anomaly/conflict in policies will be detected. Manually de-
tecting and resolving these anomalies is a critical but tedious
and error prone task. For firewall policy rules, prior research
has focused on the analysis and detection of anomalies. For
example, possible relations between rules as well as anoma-
lies are defined in terms of the relations and algorithms to
detect the anomalies by analyzing the rules have been given.
Approaches proposed for the analysis of firewall rules [10]
can be extended to support to account for aspects specific
to geospatial data.
6.4 Trust and Privacy Management
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the suggested security framework
also includes components for trust and privacy management,
because these are important goals of any data security solu-
tion.
Requirements. The trust and privacy problems in geospa-
tial databases require comprehensive solutions that can han-
dle the potential richness of the data types, nature of the
dynamic access and mobile user populations. Since geospa-
tial data is used for critical applications such as emergency
response, it is important that users can trust the retrieved
geospatial data. On the other hand, the unauthorized access
and misuse of geospatial data can lead to privacy violations.
In order to address these challenges, systems are needed with
the following capabilities: (i) mechanisms for dynamic ver-
ification of the source of the data, and (ii) privacy policies
that address the dynamic and complex nature of potential
GIS applications as illustrated in the scenarios.
Current approaches and limitations. In terms of trust,
current XML standards provide mechanisms for attaching
digital signatures to the documents. Unfortunately, current
signature standards do not provide semantics to make trust
decisions given the digital signatures [4]. Also, the new
JPEG standard provides mechanisms for attaching digital
signatures to the images but this may not be directly used
for supporting different geospatial data types. Regarding
privacy, although approaches have been proposed to enforce
privacy policies (e.g., [26]), there is no comprehensive solu-
tion covering all types of geospatial data and their use. More
importantly, an understanding of privacy in geospatial data
is needed before we propose solutions.
Proposed approach I: Trust management. Maps, satel-
lite images and other geospatial data used during an emer-
gency must be trusted. In other words, the users must be
confident about the freshness and the correctness of the
geospatial data. Even worse, in some cases, an adversary
may try to deliberately submit incorrect data to the sys-
tem. For example, a developer may want to modify demo-
graphic information related to some county to coerce city
planers into giving more construction permits. To protect
against such malicious intent or honest mistakes, we propose
to add two components to the suggested security framework.
The first component will provide services to maintain logs
to verify the source and the submission date of the geospa-
tial data and other provenance data. In a typical database
system, the database may create and store such logs. In
this framework, the geospatial data may need to be com-
bined on demand by using various sources. Therefore, logs
maintained by a single geospatial database may not be suffi-
cient. Instead, an alternative approach is to extend LSDM,
or whichever model is used to represent the spatial data of
interest, to automatically incorporate the necessary meta-
data and semantics to reason about the trust associated
with metadata and XML digital signatures. For example,
an emergency responder who reaches an accident scene first,
may update some geospatial information about the roads. If
another team approaching the scene requires the road infor-
mation, the system must ensure that this team receives the
latest information. By adding necessary digital signatures
and attributes about the trusted system logs, the second
team may verify the source, freshness and correctness of
data.
After the verification, trust must be evaluated. For ex-
ample, trust could be calculated by taking into account the
past feedback related to the source (i.e., how accurate was
the geospatial data provided in the past), the creation time
(i.e., how fresh is the geospatial data) and the contents of
the data (i.e., how likely is it that someone may tamper with
the geospatial data). The applicability of different trust cal-
culation techniques for GIS applications [60] must certainly
be investigated. After the trust calculation, based on the
estimated trust value, the system typically needs to validate
the correctness of the data through other sources. Since
geospatial data such as satellite images and maps may be
retrieved through other sources, one has to exploit the avail-
ability of such sources and specify verification policies based
on the underlying trust of the data. If the verification time
is longer than what can be tolerated by an emergency, first
responders may be better off with no validation. Cost effec-
tive validation procedure for critical geospatial data must
be investigated to take such conflicting requirements into
account.
Proposed approach II: Privacy management. As dis-
cussed in the scenarios, geospatial repositories are used to
store high resolution satellite images, the location of indi-
viduals, their demographic information, resulting in privacy
concerns. However, the definition of privacy in the context
of geospatial data is highly subjective [62]. For example, a
person may not want the image of his house accessible. How-
ever, these images are already publicly available. Therefore,
unless effective laws are enacted, this situation cannot be a
privacy concern. Due to this subjectivity, it is crucial to first
develop a better understanding of privacy issues in geospa-
tial data based for example on the scenarios described in
Section 2 as well as reviewing various privacy related doc-
uments for geospatial data. Next one has to explore how
to implement the common requirements from different pri-
vacy definitions. These requirements may include: collecting
only the necessary information, giving control over informa-
tion about one’s self and preventing misuse of collected data
[62].
To address the collecting only the necessary information
requirement, a possible approach is to develop filters for dif-
ferent geospatial data types. For example, to store high
resolution satellite images for city planning purposes, one
should not store the portions of the images that accurately
show the communication infrastructure on top of buildings
as such an infrastructure could be used to identify say mil-
itary buildings. Filtering tools need to be developed that
automatically remove security and privacy sensitive geospa-
tial data.
To address the giving control over information about one’s
self requirement, an approach is to extend the envisioned
access control tool to support privacy policies also. Each in-
dividual, when providing privacy sensitive geospatial data,
may be notified about the privacy policies of the GIS data
repository. Such preferences specify who can access the data
under what conditions and for what purposes. Suppose that
an elderly person enrolls in a location-based geospatial ser-
vice that can send an ambulance automatically to the lo-
cation of the individual during an emergency. Therefore,
privacy policy for such a service can state that in case of an
emergency, only first responders can access his address in-
formation for sending help. Clearly, this approach assumes
that the user trusts the system with respect to policy en-
forcement.
To address the preventing misuse of collected data, a pos-
sible approach is to develop techniques to enforce privacy
policies. For example, for emergency planning in the case of
an E.coli outbreak in a city water system, geospatial data
related to water pipe system could be combined with demo-
graphic and health-care related data. Such integration of
different geospatial data sources could create privacy prob-
lems. First, we should enforce the privacy policies of differ-
ent sites during the integration. If a GIS repository has a
privacy policy that states that individual’s exact addresses
can be only released during an emergency, then for planning
purposes, we may need to use some carefully aggregated
demographic data. Note that different sites may enforce
different privacy policies. Therefore, we need to integrate
these policies using the integration techniques discussed in
Section 6.3. In addition, access to certain combinations of
geospatial data may be restricted. For example, an indi-
vidual may allow his demographic and health-care data to
be accessed separately for city planning purposes. However,
the same individual may not allow his health care and de-
mographic data to be combined unless it is an emergency.
This requires extending the privacy policies to include sepa-
ration of duties for different geospatial data types. In some
situations, queried geospatial data may need to be altered
for preventing privacy/security violations. For example, a
city planning expert may be given access to high resolution
satellite images that do not show say the military facilities.
Therefore, we need to filter out the parts of the satellite im-
ages that have the sensitive data. Such filtering of geospatial
data should be carried out on the fly based on the privacy
or security requirements.
6.5 Integrity: Authentic Data Publication
Schemes for Geospatial Data
Requirements. Often state/county organizations employ
third-party data publishers to provide GIS data consumers
with access to large amounts of selected geospatial data sets
and products collected by the organization (e.g., the CaSIL
repository mentioned in Section 2 is such a third-party ser-
vice). These publishers receive periodic copies and/or up-
dates of the organization’s GIS data sets and answer queries
from GIS applications and Web services on behalf of the data
owner. Publishers relieve owners from maintaining a secure,
fault-tolerant and often expensive data management infras-
tructure, an important aspect of mission critical geospatial
data that need to be replicated.
Current approaches and limitations. For authentic
data publications, much of the work has focused on rela-
tional data and XML data. These data publication schemes
allow data consumers to efficiently verify the correctness and
completeness of the data provided by the data publisher (see,
e.g., [22, 29, 30, 35, 63]).
That is, data owners can verify whether the query result
provided by the publisher is the same as the data owner
would have provided. These approaches are based on hash-
ing schemes over the owner’s data to compute a digital sig-
nature to be (periodically) distributed to data consumers.
Existing approaches have limitations, because they do not
take into consideration the complexity of GIS data.
Proposed approach: Authentication schemes. A pos-
sible approach is to develop authentic data publication schemes
for diverse types of geospatial data. These schemes should
allow data consumers to verify the correctness and complete-
ness of both geographic features (e.g., vector data describing
thematic maps) and field-based data (e.g., satellite imagery
and aerial photography). The key challenge will be to de-
velop space efficient hash structures that allow for small sig-
nature objects to be computed by the owner and publisher,
and to be evaluated by the data consumer. For vector data,
a possible approach to develop and evaluate hashing schemes
on commonly used spatial index structures, such as R-trees
that index point, line, and region data (see, e.g., [52]). For
image data in GeoTIFF, JPEG, or PNG formats, one should
investigate Quadtree-like structures [54] in combination with
digital signature schemes and the Digital Rights Manage-
ment (GeoDRM) framework developed by OGC. In particu-
lar, compression schemes for raster image data in combina-
tion with Quadtrees seem to be good candidates for hashing
schemes that allow scaling in terms of precision (e.g., based
on the spatial resolution). An authentic data publication
module should be developed that allows GIS Web Service
to request verification objects in addition to the geospatial
data results, provided that an owner/publisher setting has
been established at the data access layer. A challenge here is
a suitable extension of GML/GIS Web Service components
to embed respective protocol information that allows the im-
mediate verification of query results by the application and
ensures the maintenance of digital signatures periodically
distributed by data owners.
7. EVALUATION
The evaluation of techniques for securing geospatial data,
like those outlined in the previous section, requires devising
suitable metrics. A suitable set of metrics should include:
(1) cost and utility of the method, (2) integration into exist-
ing GIS infrastructures, and (3) security and privacy threats.
(1) Cost and Utility of the Method. As the primary fo-
cus of the outlined research directions is on developing
novel types of security and privacy specifications for
diverse types of geospatial data, an important metric
is the expressiveness of policy specifications. While
an expressive language itself is essential, it is equally
important to balance expressiveness of the language
with the cost of performing reasoning (e.g., to what
extent can soundness and completeness properties be
assured?). The expressiveness of the specification lan-
guage also has an impact on its utility. That is, how
easy is it for GIS security managers to specify security
and privacy policies, not using a formal logic-based
language but a language that resembles concepts of
GML application schemas? A similar approach to bal-
ancing expressiveness, cost of reasoning, and utility of
the method must be taken for security policies in the
context of GIS interoperations, trust management ap-
proaches, and data authentication.
(2) Integration into Existing GIS Infrastructures.
Rather than developing security components in an ide-
alized environment, any realistic solution must inte-
grate these components into existing GIS infrastruc-
tures and applications. Such infrastructures include
GRASS, PostgreSQL, ArcGIS, and typical GIS Web
Services, such as Web map services and Web feature
services. The effort to add security components such as
policy-driven access control modules or data authenti-
cation components to a system (e.g., in the form of a
wrapper or integral system component, Fig. 2), should
be minimal, requiring only minor extensions (not mod-
ifications) to the system. Note that this metric needs
to be considered in the context of the cost and utility
metrics, as more functionality and better utility likely
requires more integration efforts.
(3) Security and Privacy Threats. The incremental de-
velopment of security components and their integra-
tion into GIS infrastructures is accompanied with the
development of security, privacy, and trust threat sce-
narios. For each type of policy, one needs develop
threat scenarios and security attacks. The availability
of such scenarios will allow one to evaluate the cor-
rectness of the security policies and investigate threats
to guide the development of more sophisticated policy
specifications, in particular those that deal with the fil-
tering and obfuscation of geospatial features. The op-
erations included in the data model (Section 6.1) can
provide the basis for constructing such threat scenar-
ios, as these operations will be the basic means to select
and modify geospatial data from GIS layers, combina-
tions of GIS layers, and from different GIS repositories
in the context of GIS repository coalitions.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Protecting geospatial data includes several tasks that raise
a variety of technical and organizational problems and chal-
lenges. In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive
view of such requirements and discussed major technical is-
sues concerning policy specification, policy interoperability,
and privacy and trust. We furthermore outlined important
directions of research to address the numerous security as-
pects of (interoperable) geospatial data and GIS applica-
tions. In order to move from theory to practice, the avail-
ability of standards for geospatial data representation and
data security is fundamental. Standards make the develop-
ment of geospatial data protection techniques affordable and
effective for the deployment of those solutions. In that per-
spective, contributing to the development of standards for
advanced geospatial data protection is another major goal
to address.
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